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Lenz v. Warden
593 S.E.2d 292 (Va. 2004)

L Facts
On January 16,2000, a correctional officer of Augusta Correctional Center
witnessed Michael W. Lenz and another inmate repeatedly stabbing a third
inmate. The two assailants ignored the officer's order to stop stabbing the victim
and continued their attack until a number of correctional officers entered the
room to end the assault. The victim died soon after the incident, with a total of
sixty-eight stab wounds all contributing to his death.'
Lenz was tried and convicted of capital murder. = Upon the trial jury's
subsequent recommendation, the trial court sentenced him to death.' On appeal,
the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed.4 Lenz then filed a petition a for writ of
habeas corpus, and the Augusta County circuit court held an evidentiary hearing.'
Subsequently, the Supreme Court of Virginia granted the habeas petition in part
and remanded the case for a new sentencing hearing.6 Ultimately, however, the
court granted the Commonwealth's petition for rehearing and reversed its prior
decision granting sentencing relief.7
AI Holding
The Supreme Court of Virginia found that Lenz's trial counsel were not
ineffective for failing to object to a verdict form that lacked the specific option
of a life sentence despite a finding of one or both aggravating factors.' Further,
the court concluded that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in declining
to consider as substantive evidence both the petitioner's and respondent's

1.

Lenz v. Commonwealth, 544 S.E.2d 299, 301-02 (Va. 2001) [hereinafter Letm11.

2.
3.

Id at 301.

8.

Id

Id; see VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31(3) (Michie 2004) (stating that the premeditated killing
of any person by a prisoner confined in a state correctional facility constitutes a capital murder).
/_zn I, 544 S.E.2d at 311.
4.
5.
Lenz v. Warden, 579 S.E.2d 194, 195 (Va. 2003) [hereinafter Lent I].
6.
Id at 199. The Supreme Court of Virginia initially held as follows: (1) that trial counsel
were ineffective for failing to object to an improper verdict form; (2) that the petitioner was not
prejudiced by the use of a stun belt during trial; and (3) that the petitioner was not entitled to a jury
instruction that he could only be convicted of capital murder if the jury found that he was the
"triggerman." Id at 197-99.
7.
Lenz v. Warden, 593 S.E.2d 292, 295 (Va. 2004) [hereinafter Lenz 1111.
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affidavits submitted at the habeas hearing.' In addition, the Supreme Court of
Virginia held that the evidence did not establish that the bailiff provided ex parte
responses to juror inquiries regarding sentencing instructions, that jurors read
relevant Bible passages during sentencing deliberations, or that a prospective
juror would automatically vote to impose a sentence of death.'0 Finally, the
Supreme Court of Virginia held that petitioner was not denied effective assistance of counsel for multiple alleged failures to investigate, develop, and present
evidence.1
IlL Analysis
A.

Verdict Form

Upon rehearing, the Supreme Court ofVirginia reconsidered Lenz's contention that his trial counsel were ineffective for failing to object to a verdict form
that did not specifically include the option of a life sentence upon finding one or
both aggravating factors.' 2 Instead, the jury received the statutory verdict form
in compliance with Virginia Code section 19.2-264.4(D)." Lenz argued that the
verdict forms must include one form that specifically provides an option for life
imprisonment despite a jury finding of the existence of one or both aggravating
factors. 14 The Supreme Court of Virginia had first addressed and accepted this
specific contention in Powellv. Commonwealth, 5 a decision handed down after LenT
V.6 The Supreme Court of Virginia concluded that Lenz' s trial counsel were not
ineffective for their inability to anticipate the court's future decision."
B. ProceduralBar
Before addressing Lenz's remaining claims, the Supreme Court of Virginia
examined and rejected the Commonwealth's assertion that petitioner's claims
9.
Id at 297.
10.
Id. at 297-301.
11.
Id. at 301-05.
12.
Id. at 295; seeVA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.2 (Michie 2004) (stating that a death sentence
is authorized only upon a finding by the jury that the defendant "would constitute a continuing
serious threat to society or that his conduct ... was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or
inhuman").
13.
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(D) (Michie 2004). The jury form read: "We, the Jury, on
the issue joined, having found the defendant guilty of Capital Murder, as charged in the indictment,
and having considered the evidence in aggravation and mitigation of the offense, fix his punishment
at imprisonment for life." LenZ II, 593 S.E.2d at 295 n.1.
14.
LenZ III, 593 S.E.2d at 295.
15.
552 S.E.2d 344 (Va. 2001).
16.
LenZIIl, 593 S.E.2d at 295; see Powell v. Commonwealth, 552 S.E.2d 344,363 (Va. 2001)
(finding that the jury is required to receive a verdict form that specifically states that a life sentence
may be imposed even after finding one or both aggravating circumstances).
17.
Len II, 593 S.E.2d at 295.
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were barred in a habeas corpus proceeding for failure to raise them at trial and
on direct appeal.'" Specifically, the Commonwealth sought to bar allegations of
improper juror contact with the bailiff and the reading of a Bible during jury
deliberation." Relying on Slayton v. Pargan,- the Commonwealth argued that
Lenz's claims were procedurally barred because he had the opportunity, immediately after the conclusion of the trial, to gather information and evidence of
jurors' alleged misconduct 2' The Supreme Court of Virginia, however, recognized that an application of the Slayton procedural bar in this case would require
attorneys "to poll jurors and any other persons involved with the criminal trial
immediately following the trial, often at the same time that counsel is involved
in filing post-trial motions and preparing for appeal."2 Declining to impose such
a requirement, the court concluded that "[a] bsent any indication that counsel or
petitioner knew or should have known of the complained-of conduct at a time
when the trial court could address the misconduct allegations, the procedural bar
in Slayton does not apply." Because no evidence indicated that Lenz or counsel
had reason to question the jurors or the bailiff, the Supreme Court of Virginia
found that Slayton did not procedurally bar petitioner's claims.'

C Affidavits
Raising a procedural issue at the habeas proceeding, Lenz argued that the
circuit court erred in refusing to treat affidavits filed by both petitioner and
respondent as substantive evidence. 2 The petitioner asserted that because the
court is permitted to read affidavits as evidence, it should have done so.26
However, because consideration of the affidavits fell within the circuit court's
discretion, the Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the trial court's decision to
disallow the affidavits under an abuse of discretion standard.2' The circuit court
did not consider the affidavits as substantive evidence for a number of reasons,
18.
19.
20.

Id. at 296-97.
Id.
205 S.E.2d 680 (Va. 1974).
Lenz III, 593 S.E.2d at 296; see Slayton v. Parrigan, 205 S.E.2d 680, 682 (Va. 1974)

21.
(holding that a habeas corpus proceeding cannot be substituted for an appeal if the petitioner "has
been afforded a fair and full opportunity to raise and have adjudicated the question of the admissibility of evidence in his trial and upon appeal").
22.
Lenz III, 593 S.E.2d at 296.
23.
Id.
24.
Id. at 297.
25.
Id The circuit court used the affidavits only to evaluate witness credibility. Id.
Id; see VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-660 (Michie 2000) (providing that "[i]n the discretion of
26.
the court or judge before whom the petitioner is brought, the affidavits of witnesses taken by either
party, on reasonable notice to the other, may be read as evidence').
27.
Lenz III, 593 S.E.2d at 297.
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"including that they had no indicia of inherent credibility, were taken without
benefit of a transcript, and-were taken a significant time after the events occurred."' Because the circuit court provided multiple grounds for its decision,
the Supreme Court of Virginia concluded that the circuit court had not abused
its discretion.'
D. Insuffident Eidence
1. ImproperCommunication with the Bailiff
Lenz claimed that the bailiff provided jurors ex parte answers to questions
regarding sentencing instructions in violation of Lenz's Sixth Amendment right
to counsel.3" Citing Stockton v. Viginia,3 the Supreme Court of Virginia stated
that Lenz had the burden to establish that the alleged contact took place.3 2 The
defense's challenge relied heavily on juror affidavits that the trial court rejected
as substantive evidence, and the Supreme Court of Virginia found the remaining
evidence inconclusive. 3 Without further evidence, the court rejected the claim
and found that Lenz did not carry his burden of proof.'
2. ExtraneousInfluence
Lenz argued that the habeas court erred when it concluded that "there was
no indication that the 'jury verdict was influenced by an improper communication in the form of a quotation from the Bible.' ,,3 In Remmer v. United States,36
the United States Supreme Court set the applicable standard for evaluating a
claim of extraneous jury contact: any direct or indirect contact with a juror during
trial is presumptively prejudicial if it concerns a matter pending before the jury.37
28.
29.

Id
Id

30.

Id

31.
852 F.2d 740 (4th Cir. 1988).
32. Lent II, 593 S.E.2d at 297; see Stockton v. Virginia, 852 F.2d 740, 743 (4th Cir. 1988)
(finding that the burden rests with the petitioner to establish that improper contact occurred).
33. Lent II, 593 S.E.2d at 297-98. The court stated:
A review of the record shows that some of the jurors and the bailiff could not recall
whether the bailiff was asked any questions at all; other jurors recalled that they asked
the bailiff some questions. No juror testified that any of the questions that may have
been asked related to the trial court's instructions.
Id
34.
Id at 298.
35. Id
36.
347 U.S. 227 (1954).
37. Len z III, 593 S.E.2d at 298; see Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229 (1954)
(holding that any form of contact with a member of the jury during trial is presumed to be
prejudicial if it regards an issue before the jury).

20041
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The circuit court found during the evidentiary hearing that there had been a Bible
open during jury deliberations and that jurors both looked at and read from it,
38
but that no evidence established which passage or passages were read. Given
the circuit court's decision not to credit petitioner's affidavits as substantive
evidence, the circuit court's factual findings were not plainly wrong, and the
9
Supreme Court of Virginia concluded that it was bound by them.
Lenz further claimed that the circuit court failed to apply the presumption
of prejudice that Remmer mandates.' However, the Supreme Court of Virginia
noted that the Remmer presumption is only triggered by showing both that
extraneous contact occurred and also that "such contact was 'about the matter
pending before the jury.' "4t The court conceded that Lenz established that
extraneous contact occurred.4 2 However, because the circuit court's factual
findings did not reveal which Bible passages were read during deliberations, the
court concluded that Lenz had failed to establish that the contact was about the
matter pending before the jury.43 Thus, the court found that Remrmers presumption of prejudice did not apply and that the extraneous contact did not influence
the integrity of the verdict."
2. JurorDumrtt
Lenz contended that the circuit court erred in seating juror Durrett, who
stated in a posttrial affidavit offered at the habeas proceeding that the "Bible says
4
The petithat the death penalty is the appropriate punishment for murder.
tioner argued that seating Durrett as a juror violated the standards of Morgan v.
Illinois.' However, during voir dire, juror Durrett specifically stated that she
would consider both life without parole and death as possible sentences in a
capital murder trial, and the circuit court found that this assertion sufficiently
47
refuted the suggestion that Durrett was biased in support of the death penalty.
38.

Lenz III, 593 S.E.2d at 298.

39. Id.; see Hedrick v. Warden, 570 S.E.2d 840,847 (Va. 2002) (establishing that "[tihe circuit
court's factual findings... are entitled to deference and are binding upon this Court unless those
findings are plainly wrong or without evidence to support them').
40. Lenz III, 593 S.E.2d at 298.
(quoting Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229).
41. Id.
42. Id
at 298-99 (recounting juror testimony that, if the Bible had been consulted, jurors did
43. Id.
not know which passages had been read).
44. Idat 299.
45. Id
46. LenzIH, 593 S.E.2d at 299; see Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719,738 (1992) (holding that
jurors who would automatically vote in favor of imposing the death penalty inevery case are unable
to follow the law and should be disqualified).
47. Lenz III, 593 S.E.2d at 300.
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The Supreme Court of Virginia determined that the statement from the affidavit
constituted "insufficient evidence upon which to find that juror Durrett herself
concurred with the statement and that she would automatically apply this 'appropriate punishment' in every capital murder case."'
Therefore, the court concluded that seating juror Durrett was appropriate and did not violate the principles of Morgan.49
E. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Lenz argued multiple claims of ineffective assistance of counsel ("IAC',
and to succeed on the allegations, he was responsible for meeting the two prong
test set forth in Strickland v. Washington."° In considering Lenz's contentions
against the backdrop of Strickland, the Supreme Court of Virginia noted that a
failure to prove the required prejudice negated any need to examine the counsel's
performance.5 ' The court subsequently rejected each of Lenz's JAC claims.5 2
IV. Application to Virginia Practice
A.

VerdiaForm

In Len Z III, the Supreme Court of Virginia stated that the petitioner's
counsel could not be found ineffective for failure to anticipate the decision later
handed down in Powell.3 However, Lenz's contention regarding trial counsel's
failure to recognize that a jury must be given a complete verdict form stating all
sentencing options was based on reasonable inferences from Atkins v. Commonwealtb, 4 decided before Lenz's trial.'5 The jury in Atkins received a verdict form
missing the option for life imprisonment if no aggravating factor5 was
proved, and
6
the Supreme Court of Virginia held this to be reversible error.
At the trial level, Lenz's counsel failed to preserve the verdict form issue for
appeal, and the Supreme Court of Virginia raised the issue sua sponte in LenZ I
48.
Id
49.
Id
50.
Id at 300-05; see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (holding that in
order to obtain relief on an IAC claim, petitioner must show that counsel's performance was
deficient in that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that the deficient performance prejudiced the case).
51.
Lent III, 593 S.E.2d at 300.
52.
Id at 301-05.
53.
Id.at 295.
54.
510 S.E.2d 445 (Va. 1999).
55.
Lenz III, 593 S.E.2d at 295; see Atkins v. Commonwealth, 510 S.E.2d 445,456-57 (Va.
1999) (finding reversible error in a verdict form that lacked the option to impose a life sentence
absent the required aggravating factors).
56.
Atkins, 510 S.E.2d at 457.
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only to conclude that the issue was procedurally defaulted. 7 Subsequently, the
majority in LentZIII identified the issue advanced in the petitioner's writ of habeas
corpus as "whether the verdict form must specifically provide the option of
imposing a sentence of life when the Commonwealth has established one or both
aggravating factors.""8 The court had previously stated that "it is materially vital
to the defendant in a criminal case that the jury have a proper verdict form," and
the verdict form given to the jury in Lent I did not fully reflect the sentencing
options available. 9 Specifically, the forms did not include the options for a life
sentence or a life sentence and a fine of no more than $100,000 despite findings
of statutory aggravation.' However, rather than fault the defense for failing to
grasp the rationale ofAtkins, the Supreme Court of Virginia absolved counsel for
not extending Atkins to its logical conclusion.
In Powell, the Supreme Court of Virginia directly addressed the issue that
the court recognized in Lent III as follows:
[wie hold that in a capital murder trial, the trial court must give the jury
verdict forms providing expressly for the imposition of a sentence of
imprisonment for life and a fine of not more than $100,000 when the
of61the aggravating factors have been proven
jury finds that one or both
doubt.
beyond a reasonable
Thus, although the court denied Lenz's writ of habeas corpus on the grounds of
ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to object to an insufficient verdict
form, Powellclearly established that a defendant can now successfully bring such
a claim.' 2

B. Affidatits
As the Supreme Court of Virginia noted, the decision to credit affidavits as
substantive evidence remains within the circuit court's discretion, and accordingly, the decision must be reviewed on a standard of abuse of discretion. 63 The
court rejected the affidavits in Lent i because they "were taken without benefit
of a transcript and.., a significant time after the events occurred."' Therefore,
attorneys should strive to give courts compelling reason to receive affidavits as
evidence. However, LenZ shows that reliance on affidavits rather than live
testimony will always carry some risk and, whenever possible, habeas counsel
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Lenrz I, 544 S.E.2d at 311.
LenZII, 593 S.E.2d at 295.
Atkins, 510 S.E.2d at 456.
Lenz 11, 593 S.E.2d at 295.
Powell, 552 S.E.2d at 363.
Id
Lenz III, 593 S.E.2d at 297.
Id
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should present in-court testimony rather than trusting that the habeas court will
credit evidence in the form of affidavits.

C. Proofof ImproperInfluences on Jurors
Lenz failed to meet the requisite burden of proof regarding the bailiff's
alleged ex parte contact with jurors and the extraneous influence of the jurors'
reading of a Bible passage during sentencing deliberations." In both the ex parte
contact and extraneous influence instances, jurors could not recall with clarity
how or even whether the events took place." Attorneys should make efforts
when potential juror issues arise to interview those parties involved as quickly as
possible to obtain the most accurate and reliable evidence possible.67
Similarly, the record inadequately supported petitioner's argument that the
seating of juror Durrett violated Morgan. Although Durrett stated that the Bible
regards a death sentence as the proper penalty for murder, the fact that she
specifically stated during voir dire that she would be able to consider both life
without parole and death as viable penalty alternatives outweighed any afterdiscovered evidence of potential bias." This result demonstrates the importance
and value of probing voir dire to unearth latent bias that may be concealed by
jurors' reflexive assertions that they will impartially weigh all sentencing options.

V. Conclusion
Although counsel in Lenz III were not held responsible for applyingAtkins
to new factual circumstances, the Supreme Court of Virginia's decision in Powell
lays to rest any uncertainty regarding verdict forms that fail to reflect all of the
jury's sentencing options. This case also demonstrates the danger of postconviction reliance on affidavits rather than in-court testimony. Len z illustrates
that despite the proffered affidavits' strong relevance and factual importance,
counsel should nevertheless anticipate a strong judicial preference for live
testimony of witnesses at habeas proceedings.
Mark J. Goldsmith

65.
66.
67.
Terrence

Id at 298.
Id at 297-99.

For a complete discussion of issues concerning the Bible and the jury, see generally
T. Egland, Prejudiced by the Presence of God-Keeing Re gious Material Out of Death Pena4y
Deibemtions, 16 CAP. DEF.J. 337 (2004).
68.
Id at 299-300.

